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１．Introduction
 The purpose of this study is to investigate 
why the Spanish regime of Francisco Franco 
（1939－1975） and the Cuban regime of Fidel 
Castro （1959－2008） could maintain diplomatic 
relations given their opposing ideologies. Spain 
was internationally isolated after WWII but could 
survive because of its anticommunist stance and 
receive U.S. military and economic assistance. It 
focuses on Spanish foreign policy toward Cuba, 
taking into consideration how Spain was able to 
“utilize” this contradictory position without having 
to become a democratic country. 
 Of the works examining the Spanish-Cuban 
relationship that prevailed following the Cuban 
Revolution, few are based chiefly on primary 
sources. This is principally due to the lack of 
declassified documents in Spain and ̶ needless 
to say ̶ in Cuba. The Archive of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Spain （AMAE）, in particular, has 
housed many documents pertaining to Cuba since 
the 1970s, many of which remain classified.
 In addition, the main researchers presently 
studying Cuba are Anglo-Saxon. Moreover, 
there seem to be relatively few studies that have 
examined the bilateral relationship from the 
Spanish point of view. The following are the two 
leading researchers who are currently studying 
Cuba related to our study: Lambie, who admitted 
to the difficulty of gaining access to the relevant 
documents,  minutely analyzes the Cuban-
European relationship on the basis of press articles 
and economic statistics. Domínguez, who was 
exiled from Cuba in his infancy, is a prominent 
American scholar on Cuba. From the Spanish 
point of view, there exist some studies pertaining 
to contemporary Spanish foreign policy toward 
Cuba as a part of studies of Spain’s overall foreign 
policy toward Latin America. In particular, Enrich1 
analyzes the general foreign policy that Spain 
applied toward this region in 1955－1985, while 
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Paz-Sánchez2 analyzes documents pertaining 
to Cuba before 1961 obtained from the AMAE. 
In addition, special mention should be given to 
Suárez Fernández’s works3, which use documents 
that are dated before or in 1965 and obtained 
mostly from Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco 
（FNFF; National Foundation of Francisco Franco）. 
However, because the Cuban theme formed only a 
part of Franco’s overall foreign policy, Fernández’s 
analysis is less profound. Finally, it should be noted 
that Pardo4 has written a detailed account of the 
foreign policy of Fernando María Castiella, the 
Spanish foreign minister from 1957 to 1969.
 However,  our  s tudy  i s  based  on  the 
AMAE’s and FNFF’s newly obtained Spanish 
documents dated in or before the 1970s as well 
as on American declassified documents. In 
addition, the present study considers the Spanish-
Cuban relationship against the backdrop of the 
international movements of the 1960s, such as 
decolonization, the Cold War, and the world’s 
economic development. Moreover, we examine 
the reason behind the perseverance of Spanish-
Cuban diplomatic relations even after the Cuban 
Revolution. Further, in light of the many Spanish 
politicians, diplomats, and academicians who have 
attributed this perseverance to “historic, cultural, 
and economic ties,” we attempt to delve into these 
ties in our study. First, in terms of the background, 
we discuss the position of Spain in the world and 
Spanish foreign policy, followed by specifics of the 
Spanish foreign policy toward Cuba in the period 
from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 to Franco’s 
death in 1975, with focus on the 1960s.
２．Spain in the World
 Owing to Spain’s “collaboration” with 
the Axis powers at the beginning of WWII, the 
Franco regime ̶ during the postwar period 
̶ could neither become members of the main 
international organizations nor become a recipient 
of the Marshall Plan. To overcome this ostracism, 
the regime attempted to be recognized by the 
U.N., endeavoring to obtain the sympathy of the 
Latin American countries as a means of winning 
their votes. This they accomplished through their 
philosophy of “Hispanidad,” which stresses the 
common cultural relationship shared by Spain and 
Latin America.
 Spain’s negotiating position was leveraged 
by the development of the Cold War owing to 
its geopolitical importance. The regime’s main 
target was its own preservation, holding its anti-
communist policy and the ideals of Christianity. 
Therefore, at the time, the regime was attempting 
to gain “agreement” with the U.S. and the Vatican. 
Finally, in 1953, Spain signed the Pact of Madrid 
（for military and economic aid） with the U.S. and 
the Concordat with the Vatican, ultimately joining 
the U.N. in 1955.
 Having acquired economic aid from the U.S., 
Spain could reach a higher stage of economic 
development, hailed as “Spain’s economic miracle” 
in the 1960s. However, Spain lost its colonies ̶ a 
part of Morocco and Equatorial Guinea ̶ and was 
also unable to become a member of the European 
Economic Community （EEC）.
 Franco tended to respect world leaders who 
fought for their country’s independence, such as 
Ho Chi Minh, irrespective of their ideology.5 On 
the other hand, he considered himself to have 
been given “a special mission” by God to seek 
salvation for Spain for its “decadence” of the Age 
of Enlightenment in the 18th century and the period 
of Liberalism in the 19th century.6
 Franco’s authority was absolute with respect 
to Spain’s foreign policy, while the influence of 
public opinion and the Spanish Court was very 
limited. However, this allowed Spain to easily 
realize its policies without obstacles arising 
from election campaigns, public opinion, or the 
Congress, as was the case in the U.S. Moreover, 
the then Spanish government was composed of 
various ideologists such as Falangists, Catholics, 
monarchists, and the military. Because there was 
considerable friction between these groups owing 
to the differences in their interests and ideologies, 
they needed a “boss” whose power was absolute. 
On the other hand, to successfully develop a non-
bureaucratic system, the Spanish government 
had to depend on each minister’s and politician’s 
individual abilities, power, influence, and relations 
17
Waseda Global Forum No. 5, 2008, 15－24
with others. At that time, censorship was imposed 
in both Spain and Cuba, and they did not widely 
publicize their relationship with each other.
 As mentioned previously, Franco and Luis 
Carrero Blanco （admiral, vice president since 
1967; president since 1973） had stressed the 
relationship with the U.S. owing to its military 
importance and with the Vatican in order to garner 
moral support from the Christian Democratic 
parties in Europe. Because Franco and Carrero had 
full control over Spanish foreign policy, and their 
priority was the “preservation” of the regime, it 
often happened that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
rather than being the final arbiter in Spain’s foreign 
affair matters, would merely receive ex post facto 
reports. On the other hand, Franco did not intend 
to undertake any active initiatives with respect to 
Spain’s international relations. Moreover, although 
Franco rarely intervened directly in ambassadorial 
appointments （but used his veto power when 
required）, he did ensure that he was accessible to 
ambassadors by paying them a considerable amount 
of attention.7 Further, Franco’s control over Spain’s 
foreign policy ensured that it did not stray from its 
principles, such as its focus on the long-term policy 
of non-intervention in the domestic policies of 
other countries, and its moral obligations.
 Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
could only undertake initiatives in other areas of 
foreign policy. Foreign Affairs Minister Castiella 
attempted to overcome both the inertia of Spanish 
foreign policy and Spain’s negative international 
image created by the Spanish Civil War and the 
pro-Nazi Falangist regime. Castiella’s policies 
were based on his previous experiences as an 
ambassador to Peru and the Vatican. In Latin 
America, he attempted to weaken the imperialistic 
Falangist ideology of “Hispanidad” and introduced 
the Spanish technocrats’ pragmatism. His first 
priority was to restore Spain to be among the first 
rank of nations, rather than the preservation of the 
existing regime at all costs. 
 In particular, Castiella insisted on the 
“neutralization of the Mediterranean” （Gibraltar）, 
to which the U.S. was opposed because of the 
Mediterranean’s strategic importance. In other 
words, he wished to increase Spain’s significance 
in the world. To accomplish this, he attempted to 
draw up his own foreign policy, seeking to distance 
Spain from the West-East conflict by becoming a 
nonaligned nation and forging alliances with Latin 
American and Mediterranean countries. Although 
he himself was not liberal, he collaborated with 
more liberal ministers. This resulted in establishing 
a more “liberal” system in the regime, which was 
necessary to be recognized by the Europeans.8 
 The more the Gibraltar issue eroded Spanish 
relations with the U.K., and the further the 
relationship with the U.S. deteriorated, the more 
antagonistic Franco and Carrero became toward 
Castiella’s policy of Mediterranean neutralization. 
Moreover, as a result of his tough negotiating 
stance against the U.S., he was not nominated to 
be a member of the new cabinet in 1969.
 In the 1970s, technocrats from Opus Dei, a 
Catholic institution; the ex-minister of industry, 
Gregorio López Bravo; and his successor ̶ also 
an Opus Dei member ̶ López Rodó placed more 
emphasis on economic policy and normalizing 
Spain’s diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe 
（Spanish “ostpolitik”）. In 1973, Spain established 
diplomatic relations with East Germany and China 
and signed a commercial agreement with the 
USSR, displaying a positive attitude toward such 
investments. 
３ ．Foreign policy toward Cuba during the 
Franco regime
 During that period, the regimes in Latin 
America were not stable because of frequent 
coups, revolutions, and civil wars. Specifically, 
since Spain shared a common heritage with Latin 
America, which was not the case with the U.S., 
Spain utilized a policy of non-intervention and 
the Estrada Doctrine （governments or changes 
in governments should not be judged by other 
nations） in its approach to Latin America.9 As a 
part of this approach, Spain applied these to Cuba 
as well. Moreover, Spain maintained diplomatic 
ties with Cuba even in the face of incidents such as 
the expulsion of Ambassador Logendio in January 
1960 （he interrupted a broadcast where Castro 
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was criticizing Spain; the ambassador was declared 
persona non grata and asked to leave Cuba within 
24 hours）, the strong criticism of Spain and 
Franco in August, and the deportation of Spanish 
priests in 1961.10 The Spanish diplomats needed to 
overcome the contradictions before maintaining the 
diplomatic relationship and upholding the regime’s 
anticommunist stance.11 To maintain diplomatic 
relations with a communist state was of great 
significance if we consider that this anticommunist 
stance helped Spain win “the U.S. approval” at 
that moment, and Spain did not have diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union, nor other Eastern 
European states.
 For matters related to Cuba, as mentioned 
previously, Spain adopted the principle of non-
intervention and the Estrada Doctrine. Franco as 
well as Castiella declared the adoption of these 
principles both privately and officially. Following 
the Lojendio incident, Franco himself privately 
referred to the principle of non-intervention, and 
in 1967, stated it publicly at the Court.12 Castiella 
declared that the policy of “non-intervention in 
other countries’ domestic policy” was an important 
Spanish norm, particularly with respect to its 
friends like Cuba.13 In 1965, in a conversation 
with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Castiella 
asserted that “in view of the common cultural 
heritage and the many human ties,” Spain 
“does not wish to break completely” with Cuba. 
However, at the same time, he stressed that there 
was “no sympathy for the Castro regime among 
Spanish leaders.”14 In 1967, he also explained to 
Alonso Vega, Interior Minister, the importance of 
maintaining the diplomatic relationship between 
Spain and Cuba, citing the following reasons: their 
shared “Hispanic ancestry, independent of the 
political ideology,” the Spanish citizens living in 
Cuba who could not abandon Cuba, Cuba’s status 
as a “bridge” toward the USSR, the significance of 
Spain’s gesture of following an independent foreign 
policy, and bilateral commercial relations.15 
 In the 1970s, this stance remained unaltered. 
The then minister of foreign affairs, López Rodó, 
declared at the U.N. General Assembly that 
differences in ideologies and political systems 
did not interfere with normal diplomatic relations 
because Spain and Cuba were part of a community 
with shared “culture, tradition, and ancestry.”16 
Similarly, in 1975, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
declared to the U.S. Embassy that generally 
speaking, Spain based its approach to Spanish-
Latin American relations on “the concept of 
accepting pluralism of ideologies” and “the concept 
of capitalizing on historical and cultural ties.”17
 Now,  we wi l l  analyze Spain’s foreign 
policy toward Cuba under Franco in terms of 
the following: 1） social and economic factors, 2） 
external factors, and 3） physiological factors.
1 ）Social and economic factors
 In the 19th century, Cuba was the last 
colony in Latin America to remain loyal to Spain. 
Moreover, many people had migrated from the 
Galicia, Asturias, Cataluña regions, and the 
Canary Islands to Cuba, mainly out of economic 
considerations, and ̶ following Spain’s defeat in 
the American-Spanish War in 1898 ̶ in order to 
evade military service in Morocco. In 1932, 37% 
of Spanish immigration to Cuba was from Galicia,18 
a northern region in Spain and the homeland of 
the parents of both Franco and Castro, and they 
were mainly conservative. In 1969, even after 10 
years of the Revolution, according to the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approximately 7,000 
to 8,000 Spanish citizens and 300,000 Spanish who 
had Cuban nationality were residing in Cuba.19 This 
was a substantial portion of the Cuban population, 
which was estimated at 8.55 million by the U.N. 
Thus, Cuba was densely populated with people 
with Spanish “ancestry” as compared with other 
Occidental countries. 
 In the 1960s, there was a “Spanish economic 
miracle” wherein Spain was transformed from an 
agricultural country to an industrialized one: in 
the 1960s, the annual GDP growth rate of Spain 
was 7.4%, while the average GDP growth rate of 
the EEC was 3.4%. In addition, during this period, 
Spain’s trade with the U.S. was 18% of its total 
foreign trade while that with Cuba ̶ which ranked 
12th among Spain’s trading partners ̶ was 1.6%. 
The year 1966 was the best trading year for Spain 
with respect to Cuba, which accounted for 2.8% of 
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Spain’s total trade.20 However, because Spain was 
not granted membership in the EEC, it was unable 
to exploit the European market. To compensate, 
Spain attempted to gain further access to the Latin 
American market. Similarly, Cuba lacked access to 
the enormous U.S. market and therefore began to 
look to other markets, such as Spain. 
 Cuba’s main export item was sugar, whose 
world market price was not stable. Following 
the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Cuba and Spain 
signed a commercial agreement that adopted a 
payment clearing system; they renegotiated this 
agreement in 1963, a time when the price of sugar 
was growing sharply. They signed an agreement 
for the period 1964－1966 granting better terms 
to Cuba, because Spain was expected to have 
a reduced harvest that year and the domestic 
cost and consumption of sugar had increased 
considerably. Immediately after the agreement was 
signed, prices fell on the world market. However, 
in the long run, Spain was able to penetrate the 
Cuban market, particularly with respect to its 
manufactured products.21 The Spanish ambassador 
to the U, S, from 1962 to 1964, Antonio Garrigues, 
explained it as follows: “It is necessary to make a 
policy not only for each day, but also for the past, 
present and future history.”22 Similarly, Castiella 
declared that through a “spiritual bond” and 
“historical tie,” Spain was maintaining a warm 
relationship with Latin America, outside of “any 
transient political contingency.”23
 Following the Cuban Revolution, Iberia was 
the only Occidental airline company to operate 
flights to Cuba, although even Iberia temporarily 
had to suspend its flights after the Cuban Crisis. 
Because many Spaniards and Spanish-Cubans sent 
goods to their families through Iberia Airlines, 
in 1975 it attempted to extend its services to 
Havana.24 However, at the same time, reductions 
in both cargo services to Cuba and the number 
of Spanish-registered vessels trading with Cuba 
were linked with the negotiation of the renewal 
of the Spanish-American agreement. Therefore, 
upon the conclusion of the agreement in 1964, as 
a gesture of concession to the U.S., Spain put on 
the appearance of effecting the above-mentioned 
reductions and decreasing its contact with Cuba.25
 In 1969, according to a report by Nicolás 
Franco, who was invited by the Cuban minister 
of commerce and received by Castro himself, 
Cuba also attempted to import Spanish vehicles.26 
In 1974, Spain gained membership to the Inter-
American Development Bank （IDB）,  while 
the Spanish minister of commerce made the 
first ministerial-level visit to Cuba since 1898. 
Moreover, Spain and Cuba signed “the largest 
bilateral trade agreement” ever signed by Spain 
with any foreign country. The U.S. Embassy in 
Spain noted the strengthening of Spain’s economic 
relation with Latin America and the preference of 
Spanish investors in that region.27 
 On the other hand, in the 1960s, there 
was a vital issue to be resolved in the bilateral 
relationship, namely, the indemnification of the 
property of Spanish citizens living in Cuba.28 
Following the Lojendio incident in 1960, Spain 
maintained its representation in Cuba, though not 
at the ambassadorial level. Before ambassadorial 
exchanges could resume, the most important 
problems that the Spaniards had to resolve were 
securing the release of Spanish political prisoners 
in Cuba, removing the prohibitions preventing 
Spanish citizens from leaving Cuba （almost 
resolved）, and indemnifying the property of 
Spanish citizens living in Cuba. In 1975, Spain sent 
a delegation to negotiate the indemnification issue, 
and the delegation came very close to concluding 
the negotiations.29
 Meanwhile, several terrorist and dissident 
groups who opposed the Franco regime had moved 
to Cuba. However, the Castro regime chose to 
focus on the economy rather than on the military, 
the reason for which can be explained as follows. In 
the beginning of the 1950s, the Spanish government 
began to be internationally recognized to a much 
greater extent, following its entry into global bodies 
such as the World Health Organization （WHO）, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization （FAO）, 
and the U.N. Thus, it held more economic power, 
which was vital for Cuba. Domínguez termed one 
of Cuba’s decision-making rules as the “Rule of 
Precedence.” According to this rule, the survival 
of the Cuban government takes precedence over 
support for another country’s revolution, thus 
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rendering state-to-state relations more important.30 
Further, the Spanish Communist Party professed 
Euro-communism, thereby distancing itself from 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, its relationship 
with the Cuban Communist Party was “not very 
empathetic.”31 
 Thus, for the above economic and social 
reasons, the exiled Spanish government could 
not exert much influence on the Castro regime 
whi le  the Franco regime had a  long term 
interest in maintaining economic relations and 
communications for the Spaniards and Spanish-
Cubans in Cuba.
2  ）External factors: Spain as an intermediary 
between the U.S. and Cuba?
 
 For Spain, it was desirable to undertake 
initiatives in its foreign policy such that its 
dependence on the U.S. was lessened in the 1960s. 
Since the 1898 defeat, Spain wanted to have a 
sphere of influence in Latin America, asserting 
that their common cultural identity formed the 
foundation for such influence. That is, Latin 
America was the most suitable target place where 
Spain could establish an effective leadership role, 
as proved by the existence of a separate entity for 
“America and Cultural relations” in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the early 20th century.32
 Spain attempted to maintain both i ts 
commercial relations with Cuba and its aid 
relations with the U.S. It was true that the U.S. 
pressured Spain to support its trade embargo 
on Cuba. However, Spain’s dependence on the 
U.S. was decreasing in the 1960s because of the 
inflow of European investment and other reasons. 
On the other hand, for the U.S., the geopolitical 
importance of Spain ̶ particularly the naval base 
of Rota ̶ was growing in light of the Middle East 
situation. In 1963, while negotiating the extension 
of the Bases Pact, Manuel Fraga ̶ the Spanish 
minister of information and tourism from 1962 to 
1969 ̶ stressed the importance of ties with Cuba 
and its trade of Spanish products. In addition, he 
threatened that the pact would not be extended 
should the U.S. take unfavorable measures such 
as cutting off its military aid or loans to Spain.33 
Furthermore, following incidents such as the 
case of Sierra de Aránzasu in September 1964 （a 
Spanish vessel en route to Havana was attacked） 
and the Palomares incident in 1966 （a B-52 
bomber carrying four atomic bombs crashed in the 
Mediterranean; one bomb was lost and found after 
a massive search）, Spanish public opinion turned 
significantly against the U.S., and Spain found itself 
in a more advantageous position.
 On the other hand, the U.S.  obtained 
information about Cuba through Spain. For 
example, in 1963, when the Spanish minister 
in charge at the embassy in Havana returned 
to Madrid, he briefed the first secretary of the 
U.S. Embassy with regard to the Cuban political 
situation. The secretary evaluated the briefing as 
“very interesting” and passed on the information 
to the Department of State.34 In May 1964, the 
Cuban party attempted to establish contact with 
the Spanish ambassador to France, José María de 
Areilza, with the hope that Spain would act as an 
“intermediary.” The American party principally 
agreed to the possibility of this negotiation, though 
it was conditioned by some reservations such 
as considerations for the upcoming presidential 
election in November.35 In September, Secretary of 
State Rusk suggested to the Spanish ambassador 
that the Spanish government “speak frankly to 
the Cubans that they must stop their interference 
in other countries.”36 Further, the director of the 
Diplomatic Information Office, Adolfo Martín-
Gamero, met with Castro in 1967. This was not 
at the initiative of the U.S.; however he stressed 
to Castro that “Spain was acting as intermediary 
between the United States and Cuba.”37 In 
Cairo also, Spanish diplomats played the role of 
“intermediary” for the U.S. and the U.A.R.38 In 
short, Spain could play the role of “intermediary” 
in the world.
 In the 1970s, because the U.S. did not want 
its bilateral relationship with Spain to worsen over 
the Cuban problem, it gradually became tolerant 
of Spain’s “peculiar” foreign policy toward Cuba.39 
Washington’s first priority with Franco’s Spain was 
always to successfully conclude the agreement 
for the use of Spanish military bases. Therefore, 
for example, in an effort “to avoid a further 
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contentious issue with the GOS ［government of 
Spain］,” the U.S. Embassy in Madrid noted that 
the issue of Cuba trading with a Spanish company 
（Barreiros） ̶ which wanted to export Chrysler 
cars manufactured in Spain to Cuba ̶ was “such 
a small matter.” Further, the embassy was of the 
view that the delicate bilateral relationship should 
not be damaged by U.S. insistence on the matter.40 
All such issued hinged upon the negotiations, since 
the bilateral relation was very fragile. Moreover, 
the U.S. government had to consider the upcoming 
presidential campaign, which restrained it to from 
undertaking an active policy. Nevertheless, the 
percentage of Spanish trade with Cuba was still 
very limited in comparison to that with the U.S. 
3 ）Physiological factors
 In this section, we examine some key words 
that have emerged through our investigations ̶ 
honor, passion, and morals.
 In Latin America, Spanish Catholic groups, 
particularly the Jesuits, alternated with the 
incomplete public educational institutions. The 
majority of Jesuits were conservative, pro-
Francoist, and followers of “Hispanidad”, and 
they were in charge of higher education in Cuba, 
particularly that of the upper classes. Frei Betto 
̶ during his interview with Castro ̶ clarified 
that Castro’s former preparatory school, Belén, 
was owned by the Jesuits. Frei Betto stated that 
the school was “independent of their political 
ideas,” “almost every Spaniard has the sentiment 
of personal honor,” and “the Jesuits particularly 
have a high sense of personal honor.”41 The Jesuits 
in Belén, due to a lack of knowledge about the 
Anglo-Saxon world, held “strong malice” against it 
because of the humiliation Spain faced in the past. 
Castro was educated in Belén and “fascinated” by 
Franco.42
 Furthermore, Castro stated that he believed 
Christianity and Socialism to have quite a few 
things in common, and even declared that Christ 
was the “grand revolutionary.” He explained this 
comparison as follows: Just like Christ gave the 
people fish and bread, Socialism provides them 
with schools, hospitals, and jobs.43 Castro went 
on to say that similar to José Martí, he disliked 
the Spanish system, but not the Spaniards, and 
disliked Fascism and the Nazis, but did not wish for 
revenge.44
 Franco, during his childhood, had witnessed 
the return of a defeated navy from Cuba to Galicia 
after the end of the American-Spanish war. This 
defeat had damaged the honor of the Spaniards. 
Castro stated that the Cuban Revolution had 
“restored the feeling and the honor of Spaniards,” 
and attributed this, rather than economic reasons, 
as the reason for Franco’s friendly attitude 
toward Cuba.45 Castro may have criticized Franco 
intentionally. However, on unofficial occasions, 
Castro did not exhibit any hostility toward the 
Franco regime.46 In fact, following Franco’s death, 
during an interview with the Spanish newspaper 
El País, Castro praised Franco’s resistance to the 
pressure exerted by the U.S. without breaking off 
diplomatic relations. He stated that “Do not touch 
Cuba” was Franco’s clear order.47 
 Second, we will examine the role that 
“passion” played in the bilateral relationship. This 
can be found in Castro’s enthusiastic propagation of 
Jesuits and his historical consciousness: “History 
will absolve me.” Castro’s former school, Belén, 
taught students “the attractive attributes” of José 
Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange, 
who insisted on “enthusiasm and aggressiveness.” 
Following these values, Castro was a nationalistic 
leader who governs with “passion”. Moreover, 
his heroes are revolutionaries, soldiers, and 
conquerors, not “Occidental, democratic leaders.”48 
His “theatricality” was mentioned by the Spanish 
Embassy in Havana.49
 Similarly, Madariaga, diplomat, writer, 
historian, and a press member of the Secretariat 
of the League of Nations, affirmed the supremacy 
of Spanish culture in the world. He believed that 
culture should be a “priority” in and the basis of 
“the moral power” of Spanish foreign policy.50 In 
1961, Castiella sent a telegram to the embassy 
in Havana in which he declared that the Spanish-
Cuban relationship should not be affected by the 
existing tension between the U.S. and Cuba and 
hoped that Spain would exercise “at any moment 
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the maximum moral authority” and remain faithful 
to the “no-intervention principle.” In addition, in 
the case of suspension or a rupture in relations, 
the embassy was told to maintain “the prestige and 
dignity of Spain” and “the defense of material and 
moral interests for the collectivity.”51 Spain had a 
negative attitude toward its own former dictator 
Batista owing to the brutality of his political actions 
as well as the low moral of the army and the 
administrative corruption that prevailed under his 
rule.52 Meanwhile, the U.S. had adopted a more 
practical attitude toward Cuba. According to the 
Spanish ambassador to Cuba, Lojendio, the U.S. 
only considered its economic relations with Cuba 
and the defense of American interests.53 At least, 
“moral reason” was cited less in American or 
Japanese governmental telegrams.
 Furthermore, according to Castro, “morality” 
is one of the most important standards by which to 
evaluate other leaders, and he criticized American 
capitalism on the basis that it was immoral. He 
admitted that Franco had a “moral and political 
stature.” Similarly, Manuel Fraga, the former 
president of Galicia （ex-minister of information and 
tourism under the Franco regime）, was welcomed 
in Cuba ̶ Castro shared a friendly relationship 
with him not because he was a fellow countryman 
but because of his achievements in Galicia.54 
Meanwhile, in 1960 the U.S. （Ambassador Bonsal） 
also hoped that Spain could help the U.S. because 
Spain’s “moral influence on the Spanish colony and 
the Cubans in general” and the cooperation of the 
“other Iberoamerican governments” would help 
bring about the downfall of the Communist regime 
in Cuba.55
 In sum, the “spiritual linkage” between the 
two countries can be measured by their relations 
with the United States, or “against the United 
States.” Further, both Castro and Franco had a 
“moral incentive” and exhibited “historicism” 
from a long-term perspective. Another Galician 
businessman, Eduardo Barreiros, pointed out the 
common values shared by Castro and Franco, such 
as honesty, passion, and patriotism.56
４．Conclusion
 The reasons  why the  Franco  reg ime 
maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba despite 
their opposing ideologies have been explained 
using vague and abstract terms such as “linkage 
of culture, tradition, and ancestry,” “economic 
reasons,” and “Galician connection.” Thus, this 
work intends to render more concrete such 
explanations. 
 Fi r s t ,  w i t h  re s p e c t  t o  t h e  b i l a t e r a l 
relationship, the “sentimental” reason was 
fundamental for Franco; namely, Spain’s honor 
that was damaged by the American-Spanish war 
and restored by Cuba. As leaders, both Franco and 
Castro possessed common merits such as morality 
and patriotism, and although they had never met, 
they “understood” each other. The proportion of 
Spain’s trade with Cuba was extremely insignificant 
in terms of total trade Spanish trade. However, 
Spanish policy was based on economic pragmatism, 
with the “long-term” point of view taking into 
consideration ties with Spanish immigrants and 
relatives still living in Cuba.
 Second, from the point of view of the elites 
under Franco’s regime, Spain needed a “peculiar” 
policy that would establish its status as a middle 
power or an influential state in a region and 
enable it to distance itself from the Cold War. In 
addition, non-democratic and anticommunist Spain 
could play a role of “intermediary” between the 
Occidental World and Latin America, especially 
between the U.S. and Cuba, approaching the 
Occidental World while maintaining relations with 
Cuba but without changing the Spanish regime. 
On the other hand, the U.S. had to consider the 
negotiation of the Bases Agreement with Spain, 
therefore the U.S. could not apply much pressure 
on Spain with regard to Cuba.
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